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Abstract. The paper presents a new version of the “Cosmological Argument” 
– considered to be an ontological argument, since it exclusively uses ontological 
concepts and principles. It employs famous results of modern physics, and 
distinguishes between event-causation and agent-causation. Due to these 
features, the argument manages to avoid the objection of infinite regress. 
It remains true, however, that the conclusion of the argument (just like the 
conclusion of Thomas Aquinas’s causal argument) is too unspecific to be 
unambiguously considered an argument for the existence of God.
I  should say a  few words about why I  presented at the bydgoszcz 
conference about “ontological proofs” ideas that are relevant for what 
has come to be known as “cosmological proofs”. First, aside from the 
special meaning Kant has given the designations “ontological proof ” and 
“cosmological proof ”, a so-called cosmological proof is at least as much 
an ontological argument as a so-called ontological proof. both sorts of 
argument aim to establish the existence of God, and existence is, of course, 
a central – perhaps the central – ontological concept. second, one might 
even say that so-called cosmological arguments, if they exclusively use 
ontological concepts, like the argument I am going to present here, are 
more ontological in kind than many so-called ontological arguments. 
After all, Anselm’s original version of what Kant was the first to call 
an ontological argument, and many later versions, involve an epistemic 
and an axiological concept: the being such that no greater being can be 
conceived. Third, in my view, the interest of so-called ontological proofs 
is mainly logical, not theological, and not metaphysical. – Well, may this 
suffice as my excuse for what follows.
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There is a kind of causation where the cause is sufficient for the realization 
of the effect (that is, for the realization of what is caused), the effect being 
some event: an entity involving a finite temporal region, particulars, and 
properties (relational and non-relational ones) had by these particulars 
within that temporal region:
(A1) Effects (i.e. what is caused) are always events.
In sufficient causation, the cause determines the coming-about of the 
effect-event; the cause does not make the effect-event merely probable, 
or more probable than it would be without the cause, and the cause is not 
merely an indispensable factor for the coming-about of the effect-event. 
In sufficient event-causation, the coming-about of an event determines the 
coming-about of the effect-event. In sufficient agent-causation, simply 
the agent determines the coming-about of the effect-event.
In what follows, the phrase “a cause of ” will always mean the same 
as “a sufficient cause of ”, and “to cause” will always mean the same as “to 
be a sufficient cause of ”. And these phrases will always be understood 
to exclude self-causation: Nothing is a cause of itself. (one may wish to 
count this as axiom (A0).) The definition of the concept that is central 
to this paper is this:
(D) A  first cause is a  cause without a  cause, in other, fully explicit 
words: a first sufficient cause is a sufficient cause (of some event), but 
a sufficient cause that itself has no sufficient cause.
It is easily seen:
(T1) If agents are not events, then every agent that is a cause is a first cause.
suppose we have an agent that is a cause, i.e. that causes some event. If agents are 
not events, then that agent is not an event, hence it has no cause (for otherwise 
it would be an  effect, and therefore an  event, since effects are always events 
according to (A1)).
Now indeed:
(A2) Agents are not events, but substances.
And therefore:
(T2) Every agent that is a cause is a first cause.
Hence:
(T3) If there are agents that are causes, then there are first causes.
but are there agents that are causes? That there are such items is doubted 
by many, even denied. Doubtless, however, there are events that are 
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causes. And if one could find an event that is a cause, but has no cause, 
then this causal event – though not a causal agent – would also serve as 
a perfect first cause. but are there events that are causes without having 
a cause? We do not have purely scientific evidence for the existence of 
such events. What we do have purely scientific evidence for is merely this:
(A3) Some physical events are causes, but there is no physical event that 
causes them.
Now, at this point, there is a crucial decision to be made in causation-
theory. It is not an empirical, it is not a scientific, it is not a conceptual 
decision; it is a genuinely metaphysical decision. A choice is to be made 
between two very plausible metaphysical principles. one of these two 
principles is known as the principle of (sufficient) causation:
(A4.1) Every event has a cause.
The other principle is one of the principles known as principles of physical 
causal closure:
(A4.2) Every physical event that has a cause is caused by a physical event.
one cannot adopt both principles – because, unfortunately, their 
conjunction is not compatible with (A3). on the other hand, each of the 
two principles under consideration has so many credentials on its side 
that it seems rationally inappropriate to reject both. let’s see what the 
consequences would be if one accepted the one, or the other.
(A4.2) is the modernization of a materialist, or physicalist, principle 
that emerged as a  metaphysical side-effect of the rise of modern 
physics. This original principle is the following:
(A4.2*) Every physical event is caused by a physical event.
This latter principle was adopted by all who, inspired by impressive 
scientific progress, considered a purely immanent world-view – a world-
view without transcendence – to be the only rational world-view. The 
insertion of “that has a  cause” after “every physical event” – which is 
of no detriment to the original metaphysical motivation – became 
necessary due to the developments in physics in the 20th century; these 
developments make modern physics entail the falsity of (A4.2*). (A4.2), 
however, is left quite untouched by them.
Now, obviously, the conjunction of (A3) and (A4.2) logically entails 
that there are physical events that are causes, but have no cause. Thus, if 
we add (A4.2) to our list of axiomatic principles (and not (A4.1)), then 
172 uWe meIXNer
the existence of first causes is established. There are, then, first causes in 
the form of physical events that are causes without having a cause.
In contrast, it is a straightforward logical consequence of (A4.1) that 
no event is a first cause. For if an event is a cause, (A4.1) requires that it 
also be caused, that is: have a cause. (A4.1) is a principle that throughout 
the roughly 2500 years of the history of philosophy was almost 
universally accepted by the philosophers as an  absolute requirement 
of rationality, comparable in this to a  law of logic. And when (A4.2*) 
became prominent in the philosophical consciousness (roughly 300 
years ago), it peacefully coexisted there with (A4.1); indeed, one could 
regard (A4.2*) as a mere specialization of (A4.1), as merely spelling out 
what it is that (A4.1) means for physical events. All that changed in the 
20th century with the establishment of quantum physics and empirical 
cosmology, and hence of the scientific fact that is stated by (A3). (A3) 
refutes (A4.2*), and it also refutes the conjunction of the logically weaker 
(A4.2) with (A4.1). but (A3) neither refutes (A4.2) taken by itself, nor 
does it refute (A4.1) taken by itself. If, tentatively, we add (A4.1) to our 
list of axiomatic principles (and not (A4.2)), continuing thereby the very 
long and almost univocal philosophical tradition in favour of (A4.1), 
we get an interesting result: There are physical events that have a cause, 
though they are not caused by any physical event.
Given (A3), one cannot adopt (A4.1) and (A4.2) together, and it does 
not seem rationally right to reject both. A choice, therefore, has to be 
made between these two principles. There is no argument that would 
rationally force one to choose (A4.1) rather than (A4.2). but since (A4.1) 
involves much less of a metaphysical commitment than (A4.2); since, in 
other words, the rational appeal of (A4.1) is more general than that of 
(A4.2), and less dependent on the rationality of a specific metaphysical 
motivation, I herewith adopt (A4.1) as axiomatic, and as a consequence 
change its label from “(A4.1)” to simply “(A4)”:
(A4) Every event has a cause.
And with both (A4) and (A3) as axioms, we now have as a theorem:
(T4) There are physical events that have a cause, though they are not 
caused by any physical event.
but, of course, with (A4) as an axiom, there is no chance that an event is 
a first cause; if there are first causes, then they must be something other 
than events. In fact, they must be agents, since the following is true:
(A5) Every cause is an agent or an event.
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(A5) makes it possible to derive:
(T5) Every first cause is an agent.
Assume that X is a first cause, and assume also that X is an event. but then, 
according to (A4), X has a cause, and is, therefore, not a first cause – contrary 
to the first assumption. Therefore (holding on to that assumption): X is not 
an event, and therefore: X is an agent (because of (A5), and because X is, qua 
first cause, also a cause).
I  am well aware that some philosophers have proposed facts, or even 
properties, as causes. but causes must be causally effective, and a property, 
taken by itself, is not causally effective; a property is only then causally 
effective – in an analogical way – if it is had, exemplified, instantiated by 
an object in such a way that the resulting fact is causally effective. but 
a fact, in its turn, is only then causally effective – in a derivative, secondary 
way – if it is replaceable in this role by a causal event. Causation by facts, 
in other words, is reducible to causation by events. There is, therefore, no 
substantial reason to reject (A5).
(T4) gives rise to the following considerations: suppose e* is one of 
the physical events that – according to (T4) – have a cause, though there 
is no physical event that causes them. Thus:
(a) e* is a physical event.
(b) e* has a cause.
(c) There is no physical event that causes e*.
Hence, by making use of (A5), we have:
(d) e* has a cause that is a nonphysical event or an agent.
Assume now the following additional axiomatic principles:
(A6) Every event that is caused by an event is also caused by an event 
that is not caused by any event.
(A7) For all x, y and z: if x causes y, and y causes z, then x causes z.
(A7) expresses the transitivity of (sufficient!) causation – one of the 
most uncontroversial principles in causation theory. (A6), in turn, is the 
Limit Principle for the Causation by Events. This, to some, may seem like 
a very problematic principle; it actually is no such thing. suppose (A6) is 
wrong, and e is an event that is caused by an event, but there is no event 
that causes e and is not caused by any event. It is easily seen (employing 
(A7)) that a consequence of this supposition is the following: all causal 
chains of events that end with E are infinite or incomplete.
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suppose C is a causal chain of events which ends with e and which is neither 
infinite nor incomplete. (Note that for a normal conception of a causal chain – 
i.e. for the exclusion of its being a loop – the truth of (A0) is necessary.) since C 
is not an infinite causal chain of events, there is a first event in C, call it “e1”. since 
C is a complete causal chain of events, there is no event that causes e1. Given the 
transitivity of causation (i.e. the truth of (A7)) and given that C ends with e, e1 
causes e. Thus there is an event (namely, e1) that causes e and is not caused by 
any event – contradicting the supposition which introduced e in the first place.
Is this consequence of negating (A6) for some event e – the consequence 
that all e-ending causal chains of events are infinite or incomplete – more 
reasonable a priori than (A6)? I don’t think so. Is this consequence more 
reasonable on empirical grounds than (A6)? I don’t think it is, certainly 
not given today’s physics.
using the two principles last introduced, we obtain from (d):
(e) e* is caused by an agent.
The first alternative in (d) leads to the result that e* is caused by an agent, just as 
does (trivially) the second alternative in (d). suppose the first alternative in (d) 
is true: e* is caused by a nonphysical event. With (A6) we obtain: e* is caused 
by an event e’ that is not caused by any event.1 but according to (A4): e’ has 
a cause, G. since e’ is not caused by any event, G must be an agent (according to 
(A5)). since G causes e’ and e’ causes e*, it follows according to (A7): G causes 
e*. Therefore: e* is caused by an agent.
Consequently we get on the basis of (T2):
(f) There is an agent that is a first cause.
And this result – since, ultimately, it is a logical consequence purely of 
the axiomatic principles (A0) to (A7) – is a theorem: a statement logically 
proven on the basis of those axioms:
(T6) There is an agent that is a first cause.
This result chimes perfectly with the penultimate result of what has 
traditionally, since Kant, been called “the Cosmological Argument for the 
existence of God”. but although Thomas Aquinas nonchalantly concludes 
from the penultimate conclusion of the Cosmological Argument – that 
there is a first cause (which Thomas certainly thought to be an agent) – its 
1 Note that e’ must be a nonphysical event. otherwise, e’ would be a physical event 
that causes e* – contradicting (c).
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ultimate conclusion: that there is God,2 it must nonetheless be emphasized 
that this is a very problematic last step. Nothing in Thomas Aquinas’s 
argument, and nothing in the modernization of it here presented: 
nothing in (T6) and the axiomatic principles on which (T6) is based, 
justifies the conclusion that this agent which is a first cause is God or 
even a god.
but, of course, the modernized Cosmological Argument I  have 
presented can be strengthened. In order to see just at what point it can be 
strengthened, consider first the compact presentation of the argument as 
it is now:
(A0) Nothing is a cause of itself.
(A1) Effects are always events.
(A2) Agents are not events, but substances.
(A3) Some physical events are causes, but there is no physical event that 
causes them.
(A4) Every event has a cause.
(A5) Every cause is an agent or an event.
(A6) Every event that is caused by an event is also caused by an event 
that is not caused by any event.
(A7) For all x, y and z: if x causes y, and y causes z, then x causes z.
______________________________[together logically entail among other things]
(T6) There is an agent that is a first cause.
replace now (A3) by (A3*) (leaving the other axioms – or premises – 
just as they are):
(A3*) The Big Bang is a physical event that is a cause, but there is no 
physical event that causes it.
The specific principle (A3*) is just as true from the point of view of 
modern physics as the unspecific (A3). With it and the rest of the axioms 
as premises, one can logically deduce:
(T6*) There is an agent that is a first cause of the Big Bang.
From (A3*) and (A4) we get: bb is a physical event that has a cause, but there is 
no physical event that causes bb. let A be a cause of bb. According to (A5), A is 
an agent or an event.
2 “ergo est necesse ponere aliquam causam efficientem primam: quam omnes Deum 
nominant” (S. Th. I, qu. 2, a. 3; see the conclusion of the secunda via).
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In case A is an agent, A is not an event (according to (A2)), and therefore A is not 
an effect (according to (A1)), i.e. A is not caused, in other words: A has no cause. 
but A causes bb. Thus: there is an agent (namely, A) that is a first cause of bb.
In case A is an event, it follows on the basis of (A6) that bb is also caused by 
an event that is not caused by any event. let e’ be such an event. It follows on 
the basis of (A4) that there is a cause of e’, and on the basis of (A5) it follows 
that that cause (any such cause) can only be an agent (it cannot be an event, 
since e’ is not caused by any event). let A´ be such an agent. A´ causes e’, and e’ 
causes bb, and therefore (according to (A7)): A´ causes bb. moreover, since A´ 
is an agent, it is not an event (see (A2)), and therefore not an effect (see (A1)), 
i.e. A´ is not caused, in other words: A´ has no cause. Thus we have again: there 
is an agent (namely, A´) that is a first cause of bb.
An agent that is a first cause of the big bang – that is: of the initial event of 
the Physical World – does seem to be godlike. by excluding the causation 
of the same event (any event) by several agents – which is a plausible 
theoretical step – we can even obtain that there is one and only one agent 
that is a first cause of the big bang. moreover, also in line with traditional 
theism, the agent that causes the initiation of space-time-energy-matter 
can hardly be denied to be nonphysical. However, nothing so far shows 
that this agent is different from, say, what schopenhauer called “the Will”, 
different from a blind, irrational, and basically evil – but transcendent 
– source of the universe. That the First Cause of the beginning of the 
universe is different from such a being is a matter of faith. but, note, it 
is also a matter of faith that God Himself is different from such a being.
Neither the axioms nor the theorems in this paper seem to me utterly 
speculative, epistemologically irresponsible, or irrational. I  certainly 
believe that they provide food for serious thought. Yet there are, of 
course, objections. I will consider three of them (which actually came up 
when I presented the paper at the bydgoszcz conference).
Objection 1 (against (A3*)): The big bang does not exist, because the 
big bang, if it is anything, is the total physical event which occurs at the 
first moment of time, and there is no first moment of time (as stephen 
Hawking has famously held). Response: even if there is no first moment 
of time, it does not follow that there is no initial physical event. Note 
that events, though they are required to be temporally finite according 
to the notion of event here employed (see the beginning of this paper), 
are not required by that notion to have a first or a last moment. An initial 
physical event is a  physical event whose temporal region is the initial 
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interval of time – and that interval may be an interval that is open on one 
side, even on both sides. The big bang, then, is the total physical event 
whose temporal region is the initial interval of time. one might further 
object that there is not only no first moment of time, but also no initial 
interval of time. but, by the lights of modern physics (which may be 
wrong of course, but there is no guide in these matters that is known to 
be better), the initial interval of time is simply the first interval of time 
whose duration is the Planck-time (that is, 10–43 sec). There certainly is 
such an interval of time (even if there is no first moment of time), and 
the corresponding event – the big bang – is, as far as we know, correctly 
described by (A3*).
Objection 2 (against (A3) being the entire scientifically warranted 
truth): There is purely scientific evidence not only for (A3) but also for 
the existence of physical events that are causes without having a cause. 
For it is a scientific principle that if a physical event is not caused by any 
physical event then it is not caused by anything. Response: The objection 
relies on (A4.2) – which is a principle of causal closure – being a scientific 
principle. No doubt, many scientists employ that principle; but that, 
by itself, does not make it a  scientific principle.3 In fact, (A4.2) is not 
a scientific, but a metaphysical principle – just like (A4.1), the principle 
of causation. It is a metaphysical principle because logical, mathematical, 
empirical, and methodological-esthetical considerations alone are not 
sufficient for warranting its assumption.
Objection 3: The notion of agent causation, which is necessary for 
obtaining (T6) and (T6*), is an  irremediably unclear notion. When, 
for example, does agent causation happen? Response: This is a  stock 
objection, the merits of which are doubtful. For one thing, the notion of 
event causation is not so clear either (and yet we continue to use it, and 
could not well do without it). For another thing, I have offered a detailed 
analysis of agent causation in my books Ereignis und Substanz and The 
Two Sides of Being, in the former regarding both creatural and divine 
agency, in the latter regarding only creatural agency. A comprehensive 
theory of causation, both of event causation and agent causation, can 
be found in my book Theorie der Kausalität, also containing extensive 
3 many scientists in the past have made successful use – within the very context of their 
scientific endeavours – of the hypothesis that God exists and has created the universe (for 
example, Johannes Kepler in his arduous search for the laws of planetary motion). but 
that, of course, does not imply that the existence of God is a scientific principle.
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discussions of the literature. some of the main results of Theorie der 
Kausalität are presented in my paper “Causation in a New old Key”. The 
emergence of creatural agent causation in the course of natural history 
is defended in several of my papers, for example, “The emergence of 
rational souls” and “New Perspectives for a  Dualistic Conception 
of mental Causation”.
And when does agent causation “happen”? Instances of agent 
causation do not happen, since they – in contrast to the effects involved in 
them – are not events (and only events can happen). but if one absolutely 
wishes to assign a time to an instance of agent causation, then it is simply 
the time of the effect that is involved in it.
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